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Don’t Change the Subject: How State
Election Laws Can Nullify Ballot
Questions
Cole Gordner*
ABSTRACT
Procedural election laws regulate the conduct of state elections and provide for greater transparency and fairness in statewide ballots. These laws ensure that the public votes separately
on incongruous bills and protects the electorate from uncertainties contained in omnibus packages. As demonstrated by a slew
of recent court cases, however, interest groups that are opposed
to the objective of a ballot question are utilizing these election
laws with greater frequency either to prevent a state electorate
from voting on an initiative or to overturn a ballot question that
was already decided in the initiative’s favor. This practice is subverting the original intent of procedural election laws and stripping citizens of the right to participate in a direct democratic
process by nullifying their votes.
While procedural election laws were originally implemented
as a means of safeguarding the average voter, they have now be* J.D. Candidate, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson Law, 2021. I thank my
family and friends for all the love and support they have provided me over the
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come an important tool for special interest groups to block legislation they oppose without having to attack the actual substance
of the bill. This Comment will argue that parties are misusing
procedural election laws and that such election laws must either
be amended or replaced to once again achieve their underlying
purpose of protecting voters. It will begin by examining the history and purpose of some of the most common procedural election laws on the books. It will then examine how some of these
laws are used to block the Marsy’s Law initiative, which has recently been proliferating throughout the states. Finally, this
Comment will emphasize some of the more serious consequences
resulting from these practices and provide recommendations for
how to alleviate them while still protecting the public interest.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, millions of citizens across the United States engage
in the democratic process and cast votes for their preferred candidates to win public office.1 In addition to casting votes for people,
many citizens will also find themselves deciding on matters of public policy, typically in the form of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ ballot questions. Ballot questions—also called ballot measures—are “proposals to enact
new laws or constitutional amendments or repeal existing laws or
constitutional amendments that are placed on the ballot for approval or rejection by the electorate.”2
Interest groups and other organizations who are opposed to a
ballot question’s underlying objective frequently utilize procedural
election laws to exploit statewide ballots and nullify legislative initiatives, thereby stripping the electorate of a meaningful voice.3 For
example, opponents of Marsy’s Law—the package of “victim’s
rights” bills which has been percolating throughout the states over
the last decade—have been using single-subject and separate-vote
requirements to prevent a legitimate referendum either from occurring or being counted. States need to begin responding to these undemocratic practices and amend their ballot procedures to ensure
that legislation, which may be the culmination of years of hard
work, is not overturned on what amounts to a technicality.4
Although the United States is a representative democracy—
meaning a government comprised of representatives chosen by the
people5—the concept of allowing all eligible voting citizens to make
decisions via ballot has been present since its foundation.6 The
popularity of the idea of direct democracy has waxed and waned
throughout American history, peaking during the Progressive Era
of the 19th Century.7 Today, nearly every state allows for some
form of direct governing by the statewide electorate, and most of
these states also have a number of procedural election laws in
1. Voter Turnout, FAIRVOTE, https://bit.ly/3dfFred [https://perma.cc/8GF43HCA] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
2. What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM INST., https://bit.ly/34N8odJ (last visited Dec. 2, 2020 ).
3. Infra Part II.C.
4. Infra Part III.
5. Representative Democracy, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (2010).
6. Infra Part II.A.
7. Infra Part II.A.

R
R
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place.8 The laws were meant to protect the public from voting on
omnibus bills and other ambiguous legislation, the actual effects of
which may have been entirely unknown to the average voter.9 Organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)10
are now subverting this purpose and taking advantage of these laws
to prevent the public from voting on a proffered bill at all.11
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of direct democratic processes in the United States: how they were formed, why
they were formed, and how they gradually expanded throughout
the states.12 It will then examine some of the most common procedural election laws that states have adopted for their ballot initiatives and which form the basis for most of the litigation relating to
challenging ballot questions.13 Finally, a string of cases challenging
Marsy’s Law, with varying degrees of success, will be considered to
demonstrate the arguments typically offered to invalidate ballot
questions and the judicial outcomes that may follow such
challenges.14
Part III of this Comment will examine some of the negative
consequences arising from the use of procedural election laws to
obstruct public referenda.15 It will then offer some recommendations that states may adopt to alleviate these unwanted consequences and provide for more just outcomes given the minute scope
of these challenges which may sometimes amount to little more
than formatting errors.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Purpose of Statewide Referendums and Direct
Democracy
Direct democracy, the creation and/or approval of laws by the
people as a whole,17 is a concept that has been present in the
8. Infra Part II.A.
9. Infra Part II.B.
10. The mention of the ACLU in this Comment is purely for illustrative purposes and does not express any personal views towards the organization or the
controversy in this Comment.
11. Infra Part II.C.
12. Infra Part II.A.
13. Infra Part II.B.
14. Infra Part II.C.
15. Infra Part III.A.
16. Infra Part III.B.
17. STEPHEN MICHAEL SHEPPARD, Democracy, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY
(Desk ed. 2012).
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United States since its origin as a British colony.18 In the early 17th
Century, direct democracy took its earliest form in the United
States as New England town meetings, which were communal gatherings for the purpose of enacting community laws.19
The U.S. Constitution’s preamble enshrines the idea of governing via the popular will: “We the people of the United States, in
Order to form a more perfect Union.”20 The Framers, however,
were weary of the notion of the popular will and feared mischievous factions that might utilize the non-deliberative process to propose stark political policies that would infringe upon property rights
and the rights of others.21 As a result, direct democracy on the federal level was originally limited to the election of representatives to
the Constitutional Conventions and, subsequently, the election of
U.S. Representatives22—although the federal government did eventually allow for the direct election of U.S. Senators by passing the
17th Amendment.23 The United States remains one of the few significant democracies in the world to never hold a truly nationwide
public referendum, one in which all eligible U.S. citizens may vote
for or against a federal law.24
Unlike the federal government, states have demonstrated a
readiness to embrace the popular will of direct democracy and public referendums.25 Each of the original 13 states, except Virginia,
submitted its state constitution to the people for ratification26—the
process of approving a governing document via popular will or
18. Steven Frias, Note, Power to the People: How the Supreme Court Has Reviewed Legislation Enacted Through Direct Democracy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
721, 733–34 (1998) (explaining that the Founding Fathers recognized two forms of
democracy—representative and direct—and chose the former as the foundational
structure for the U.S. government).
19. Id. at 735; see also Daniel Farbman, Reconstructing Local Government, 70
VAND. L. REV. 413, 419 (2017) (providing a description from John Adams who
characterized New England town meetings as communal gatherings and collective
effort).
20. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
21. K.K. DuVivier, The United States as a Democratic Ideal? International
Lessons in Referendum Democracy, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 821, 825 (2006); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (arguing that a faction comprised of a majority of the electorate would hold all others subservient to them in a “pure
democracy”).
22. DuVivier, supra note 22, at 825–26.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six
years . . . .”).
24. DuVivier, supra note 22, at 823.
25. Id. at 830.
26. Id.
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statewide convention.27 The voters in Massachusetts were even
able to utilize this method of approval to make changes to their
constitution before ratification.28 Most recently, Rhode Island continued the tradition of ratification through popular vote by submitting a new state constitution to its voters for approval in 1986.29
Following the passage of state constitutions, the practice of direct democracy remained relatively stagnant in the United States
for nearly a century.30 The Progressive movement, which formed in
the late 19th Century as a result of concerns over large, wealthy
political machines controlling the democratic process, brought with
it a renewed desire for government by popular will.31 Professor
DuVivier provides the rationale behind the desire to revisit and expand the practice of direct democracy:
The Progressives turned away from legislatures controlled by
special interests. They proposed the citizen-initiated referendum
as an alternative mechanism for creating laws—a means of circumventing legislatures rather than working with them. The
Progressives argued that referendums could correct the control
of government by moneyed interests and could force action when
elected officials became “paralyzed by inaction.”32

Between 1898 and 1918, 25 states adopted one, or both, of two
forms of statewide referendum procedures: citizen-initiated referendums and legislature-initiated referendums.33 Citizen-initiated
referendums allow citizens to refer a law that has passed a legislature to the ballot by collecting a set number of signatures from eligi27. Id. at n.50.
28. See Matthew V. Sirigu, Note, Relatedness Requirement in Flux: Why Uncertainty Surrounds Massachusetts Ballot Questions and Their Corporate Sponsors,
51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 159, 164 n.28 (2018) (“The legislative body in existence at
the time prepared the first draft of the constitution and failed to include a bill of
rights, which led to an overwhelming rejection by Massachusetts voters in 1778.”).
29. State Constitution, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2DwylB7 [https://perma.cc/
6HE9-9D8Q] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020); see also Constitution of the State of Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations, STATE OF R.I. GEN. ASSEMBLY: R.I. CONST.,
https://bit.ly/2LaGijF [https://perma.cc/QCU4-9KBC] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
30. DuVivier, supra note 22, at 830–31.
31. William Sparks & Malinda Morain, Usurping Democracy and the Attempts
to Ban Hydraulic Fracturing, 5 LSU J. OF ENERGY L. & RES. 313, 313–14 (2017);
see also DuVivier, supra note 22, at 830–831.
32. DuVivier, supra note 22, at 831.
33. Id.; see M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 3
(2003) (explaining that these states included Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming).
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ble voters.34 The voters may then vote on whether to uphold or
repeal the law.35 Legislature-initiated referendums (or legislative
referrals) refer to a process by which a state assembly passes legislation, typically a state constitutional amendment, and then submits it
to the general public for final approval.36 Over time, many states
began to enact laws regulating the content and conduct of such procedures in order to protect them from undue influence or political
manipulation.37
B. Common Procedural Election Laws and the Rationale Behind
Them
Some of the most common challenges to ballot questions fall
into one of three categories: single-subject, separate-vote, and
overly vague. Challengers to initiatives will sometimes allege multiple defects in the formatting or substance of the question to increase their chances of nullifying the ballot question altogether.38
Each of them will now be discussed in turn.
1. Single-Subject Requirement
Single-subject laws are a common procedural election law
found in state constitutions or codified in state statutes.39 These
laws require that state-wide ballots contain only one issue or subject
when they present amendments or legislation on which citizens will
vote.40
34. J. Michael Marshall, Close Encounters of the Referendum Kind, 84 FLA. B.
J. 56, 57 (2010).
35. Citizen Referendum, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/37UrmQj [https://
perma.cc/6J7S-NR44] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
36. Legislatively Referred Constitutional Amendment, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
bit.ly/2P0f7sV [https://perma.cc/VTW5-LM5G] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
37. Infra note 42 and accompanying text; see also infra note 43 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Mont. Ass’n of Ctys. v. State, 389 Mont. 183, 185 (2017) (alleging
violations of both the separate-vote and single-subject requirements); see also
League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar, 2019 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS
623, 5–7 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2019) (alleging a violation of the separate-vote requirement and that the language used did not “fairly, accurately, and clearly” inform the
public of the nature of the bill).
39. Justin W. Evans & Mark C. Bannister, The Meaning and Purpose of State
Constitutional Single Subject Rules: A Survey of States and the Indiana Example, 49
VAL. U.L. REV. 87, 88 (2014).
40. Single Subject Rule, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2NNObxb [https://
perma.cc/3SFC-M8Y9] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020); see also Single Subject, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (2010); see, e.g., PA. CONST. art. III, § 3; FLA. CONST. art.
III, § 6.
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Currently, 41 of the 50 states have some general form of the
single-subject rule.41 New Jersey introduced the first of these rules
in 1844.42 The following outlines the overall goals of such laws:
The primary and universally recognized purpose of the one-subject rule is to prevent log-rolling in the enactment of laws—the
practice of several minorities combining their several proposals
as different provisions of a single bill and thus consolidating their
votes so that a majority is obtained for the omnibus bill where
perhaps no single proposal of each minority could have obtained
majority approval separately.43

In the context of ballot questions, single-subject requirements protect the voter from having to cast a decisive vote on a package of
bills, the contents of which may be entirely unknown to the voter,
aside from a very brief ballot title and question.44 Another primary
function of single-subject laws, as mentioned above, is protecting
voters from political logrolling.45 A classic scenario of logrolling
looks like this: Lawmaker A and Lawmaker B both have proposals
that will likely not pass by themselves, so the two lawmakers combine both of their proposals into a larger omnibus bill, and both
lawmakers agree to vote favorably for the bill.46 This process may
involve multiple lawmakers and lead to a bill whose contents encompass multiple subjects with little to no relationship between
them.47 Single-subject rules prevent electors from having to accept
part of an initiative that they would otherwise oppose to achieve a
change to the constitution that they support.48
Although the parameters of single-subject rules are relatively
clear, their actual application presents difficulties.49 Some courts
41. Evans, supra note 40, at 88.
42. Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42
MINN. L. REV. 389, 389 (1958); Daniel N. Boger, Note, Constitutional Avoidance:
The Single Subject Rule as an Interpretive Principle, 103 VA. L. REV. 1247, 1253
(2017); see also N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VI, ¶ 4 (amended . . .) (requiring that all laws
which shall create debts or liabilities on behalf of the state shall only be authorized
by a law with a single object).
43. Ruud, supra note 43, at 391.
44. Boger supra note 43, at 1248–49.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1253–54.
47. STEPHEN MICHAEL SHEPPARD, Omnibus Bill, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY
(Desk ed. 2012).
48. See Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 988 (Fla. 1984) (noting that an initiative proposal with multiple subjects, in which the public has had no representative
interest in drafting, places voters with different views on the subjects contained in
the proposal in the position of having to choose which subject they feel most
strongly about).
49. Evans, supra note 40, at 90.
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have been criticized for interpreting the requirement haphazardly,
or even not at all.50 Furthermore, when judges do decide to enforce
the requirement aggressively, they are likely to do so based on their
personal views towards the specific legislation, rather than neutral
judicial principles.51 In states that do aggressively enforce their single-subject requirement, the rate of upholding an initiative drops
from 83 percent when the judge favors the policy to 42 percent
when the judge disagrees with the policy.52 As the judiciary is designed to be a non-political organ of our government,53 the skewed
application of single-subject requirements is problematic.
2. Separate-Vote Requirements
Separate-vote requirements are similar to single-subject requirements in terms of purpose, but they have a much broader
scope of application. Whereas single-subject laws address the substance of the initiative being put to a vote, separate-vote laws focus
on the potential change to the current constitution and “the degree
to which a proposed amendment would modify the existing constitution.”54 Separate-vote laws typically require that a state’s citizens
vote separately on any proposed amendments to their state constitution.55 Essentially, if passing a law would change more than one
section of a constitution or statute, the state must provide the electorate with the opportunity to vote on each of the changes
individually.56
In some instances, separate-vote laws either contain language
or incorporate a judicial test that asks, for example, would “the pro50. Id. at 89; see also Ind. State Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. Of Sch. Comm’rs of the
City of Indianapolis, 679 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that the
court has historically taken a laissez-faire approach to determining whether a violation of the single-subject rule has occurred and recognizing that this approach
has resulted in the implied authorization for the state’s General Assembly to accord minimal attention to the requirement).
51. John Matsusaka & Richard Hasen, Aggressive Enf’t of the Single Subject
Rule, 9 ELECTION L.J.: RULES, POL., & POL’Y 399, 427 (2010) (finding that judges
upheld initiatives they disagreed with only 42.1 percent of the time while they upheld initiatives they agreed with 83.2 percent of the time).
52. Id.
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (positing that the judicial
branch is to be distinct from the other so-called “political branches”).
54. See F. Troupe Mickler IV, Note, The Oregon Supreme Court Disregards
the “Closely Related” Requirement of its Separate-Vote Doctrine in Upholding a
Property Forfeiture Initiative. Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team V. Kitzhaber,
145 P.3d 151 (Or. 2006)., 39 RUTGERS L.J. 1037, 1046 n.64 (2008).
55. See Philip Bentley, Armatta v. Kitzhaber: A New Test Safeguarding the
Oregon Constitution from Amendment by Initiative, 78 OR. L. REV. 1139, 1146
(1999).
56. Mickler, supra note 55, at 1046 n.64.
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posal make two or more changes to the constitution that are substantive and that are not closely related[?]”57 What constitutes a
change that is “substantive” is generally not at issue for courts that
hear cases involving the single-subject requirement.58 What counts
as being “closely related,” however, is more of a gray area and permits judges significant freedom in making their decision.59
Some state judiciaries, such as Oregon’s, have attempted to define a judicial standard that will allow judges to rule more predictably and consistently on whether two or more provision/
amendments are closely related. The Oregon Court of Appeals
outlined a “necessary implication” test which asks whether the two
or more substantive changes to the constitution are so closely related that a vote in favor of one proposed amendment necessarily
implies a vote in favor of the other.60 Ultimately, in a later case, the
Oregon Supreme Court rejected the necessary implication standard, along with a few other proffered tests.61
While single-subject and separate-vote requirements are, for
the most part, clearly defined laws that organizations can use to
challenge the validity of ballot questions, they are not the only
means to dispose of an unwanted initiative.
3. Word Limits, Plain Statements of Fact, and the Vagueness
Defense
Some states require that ballot questions fall below a specified
word limit to be eligible for placement on the ballot.62 Additionally, a state may require its Secretary of State or other administrative official to publish a short and plain statement of fact regarding
the relevant ballot question and the effect it likely will have in the
state.63 Both of these types of laws serve the purposes of keeping
57. See, e.g., Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”) v. State, 404 P.3d 733, 742,
196 (Mont. 2017) (emphasis added).
58. Id. (pointing to a generally accepted definition of substantive as found in
Black’s Law Dictionary).
59. Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, 145 P.3d 151, 162–66
(Or. 2006) (Durham, J., concurring) (detailing Oregon’s struggle to determine a
uniform standard for “closely related” and explaining the various ways the state
courts had defined it up until that opinion was issued).
60. Dale v. Keisling, 999 P.2d 1229, 1233–34 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
61. Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team, 145 P.3d at 163–64.
62. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9051(b) (West 2015).
63. See, e.g., 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201.1 (1986) (“Whenever a proposed . . .
ballot question shall be submitted to the electors of the Commonwealth in referendum, the Attorney General shall prepare a statement in plain English which indicates the purpose, limitations and effects of the ballot question on the people of
the Commonwealth.”).
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the electorate informed about the bill on which they will be voting
and ensuring as little confusion as possible when it comes to the
substance and readability of the question.64
Word limits and plain statements of fact are both susceptible to
the challenge of being unconstitutionally vague or misleading,
meaning the ballot question impermissibly confused or deceived the
average voter.65 To withstand these challenges, a statute generally
must meet the standard of being “specific enough to give persons of
common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the
proscribed conduct.”66 It is difficult to define “vagueness” with
great specificity, but a successful challenge will result in the termination of the entire bill in question.
Recently, the League of Women Voters asserted a vagueness
challenge against Florida’s Amendment 8, which was on the ballot
for voters in 2018.67 Among other provisions, the bill would have
stripped school boards of the authority to control, operate, and supervise charter schools.68 The proffered question, however, did not
specifically mention charter schools but instead described them as
“public schools not established by the school board.”69 The Supreme Court of Florida determined that by not explicitly mentioning charter schools, the question was inherently misleading to
Florida voters, and therefore it overturned the ballot initiative.70
It is also worth mentioning that in 2017, Ballotpedia and researchers at Georgia State University conducted an assessment on
how the average ballot question reads.71 They found the average
ballot question typically necessitates at least some college-level education to be understandable.72 This is due in some part to the
“legalese” that is inherent to any question pertaining to a bill, but it
demonstrates the level of clarity lawmakers must ensure they reach
in order to prevent a vague/misleading challenge.
64. See Ballot Title, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2uGSAuV [https://perma.cc/
E49U-N7T6] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).
65. See Johnson v. Ames, 76 N.E.3d 1283, 1284 (Ill. 2016); see also Sprague v.
Cortes, 145 A.3d 1136, 1137 (Pa. 2016) (Baer, J., concurring).
66. Jay M. Zitter, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutory
Voting Offense, 5 A.L.R.6th 1, 2 (2005).
67. Detzner v. League of Women Voters, 256 So. 3d 803, 806 (Fla. 2018).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 810–11.
71. Sierra Hatfield, Unclear Ballot Language Comes Under Fire, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’T (Nov. 2, 2018), https://bit.ly/3adNR2Y [https://perma.cc/
2TAH-J3SH].
72. Id.
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C. Challenges to Ballot Questions in Practice
1. Marsy’s Law
Marsy’s Law is one ballot initiative that is frequently at the
center of lawsuits about procedural election law infringements.73
While this is by no means the only initiative to face election law
challenges, the frequency and contemporaneous nature of the challenges’ make Marsy’s Law a valuable resource to dissect the current
misuse of procedural election laws.
This Comment will focus primarily on cases from Montana,
Kentucky, and Pennsylvania because they are useful in illuminating
how election law challenges function in practice and the drastic consequences they can have. Montana Association of Counties v. State
(“MACo”)74 demonstrates a statewide interest group adjudicating a
ballot initiative pursuant to a separate-vote/single-subject law.75
Westerfield v. Ward (“Westerfield”)76 not only demonstrates a
vagueness challenge, but the Kentucky Supreme Court also provides one possible method for states to avoid the potential dangers
of procedural election laws.77 Lastly, League of Women Voters of
PA & Haw v. Boockvar (“Boockvar”)78 provides a case that is being adjudicated concurrently with the writing of this Comment and
has potential to be resolved utilizing the model outlined in Westerfield v. Ward, which will be discussed in the following section.79
a. Background
Henry Nicholas started the Marsy’s Law initiative in California.80 He began this following the rape and murder of his sister
Marsy by her ex-boyfriend.81 While out on parole, the ex-boyfriend
73. See Marsy’s Law Crime Victim Rights, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/
2CzIg8u [https://perma.cc/E5QV-7ALV] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020). Westerfield v.
Ward, 599 S.W.3d 738 (Ky. 2019) (alleging that the proposed ballot question failed
to comply with constitutional requirements with respect to the adoption of an
amendment). See also Mont. Ass’n of Ctys. v. State, 404 P.3d 733 (Mont. 2017)
(alleging that the proposed constitutional amendment violated Montana’s separate-vote requirement); League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar, 219 A.3d 594
(Pa. 2019) (alleging that the proposed constitutional amendment violates the state
constitution’s requirement that separate amendments receive separate votes).
74. Supra note 39.
75. See Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”) v. State, 404 P.3d 733 (Mont.
2017).
76. Westerfield v. Ward, 599 S.W.3d 738 (Ky. 2019).
77. Id. at 751–52.
78. Supra note 39.
79. Supra note 39.
80. About Marsy’s Law, MARSY’S LAW, https://bit.ly/32apyPH [https://
perma.cc/RUN4-9683] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
81. Id.
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would harass Nicholas and his family while they were in public
places, which they found extremely traumatic.82 As a result,
Nicholas started a nationwide lobbying effort for states to amend
their constitutions to include a “Victim’s Bill of Rights” to safeguard others from having to endure a similar experience.83
The actual substance of Marsy’s Law varies from state to state,
but it is typically a package of 10 to 14 amendments that all have
the purpose of securing rights for victims of crimes equal to those of
defendants in criminal proceedings.84 The amendments include,
but are not limited to, the right to receive notification of and be
present at criminal justice proceedings; the right to refuse discovery
requests; the right to confer with prosecutors; the right to restitution; the right to be made informed of rights; and the victims’ role
at parole consideration hearings.85
The attempt to equate a victim’s rights with those of a criminal
defendant has drawn opposition from numerous organizations, notably the ACLU and the League of Women Voters.86 Whenever
Marsy’s Law percolates into a new state, these groups file lawsuits
against it alleging as many procedural defaults as is feasible. They
do this to prevent the ballot measure from being voted on or taking
effect, as demonstrated by the following series of cases.87
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Marsy’s Law Crime Victim Rights, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2CzIg8u
[https://perma.cc/2EJM-Z7KZ] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
85. California Annual Review: Summary: 2008 California Criminal Law Ballot
Initiatives, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 173, 176–90 (2009). See CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 28(b). See also S.B. 1011, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2018).
86. Katie Meyer, Marsy’s Law Explained, WITF, http://bit.ly/36wubHB
[https://perma.cc/J3JP-XNJT] (Oct. 2019); Jeanne Hruska, ‘Victims’ Rights’ Proposals Like Marsy’s Law Undermine Due Process, ACLU (May 3, 2018, 10:00
AM), https://bit.ly/3jqK2fa [https://perma.cc/KL2N-82JX] (arguing that a criminal
defendant’s rights are protections from a state that is attempting to deprive said
defendant of their personal liberties, so such rights cannot be equated with a victims rights). For these reasons, defendants’ rights should have greater protection.
Id.
87. See Elizabeth Hardison, Opponents of Marsy’s Law Are Suing to Keep the
Crime Victims Measure off the Nov. 5 Ballot, PA. CAP. STAR (Oct. 10, 2019), https:/
/bit.ly/3osIMM0 [https://perma.cc/V7T3-69G3]. See also Montana Marsy’s Law
Crime Victims Rights Initiative, CI-116 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/
2qOEOE8 [https://perma.cc/T9SE-6RVP] (last visited Nov. 9, 2019); Victim’s
Rights, ACLU OF IA., https://bit.ly/2O9ZQFi [https://perma.cc/DVK2-RHZZ] (last
visited Nov. 9, 2019); Ryland Barton, Kentucky Supreme Court Blocks ‘Marsy’s
Law’ Constitutional Amendment, WFPL, https://bit.ly/2O73BeQ [https://perma.cc/
J6F8-8EUX] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020); Vote NO on Ballot Amendment 6
(“Marsy’s Law”), ACLU OF FLA., https://bit.ly/2NHgsFt [https://perma.cc/D9FSKEBJ] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
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b. Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”) v. State
In 2017, MACo involved the first successful challenge to a
Marsy’s Law ballot initiative.88 Montana is one of the states that
allows its citizens to bypass the need for the state legislature to first
pass legislation. Montana permits citizens to place initiatives on the
ballot if a requisite number of its electorate signs a petition in favor
of the measure. That is how Marsy’s Law earned its place on the
ballot in this instance.89
The Montana electorate voted on the Marsy’s Law ballot question on November 8, 2016, and it received significant approval, with
66 percent of the voters affirming the initiative.90 Marsy’s Law was
set to take effect on July 1, 2017; however, ten days before this date,
the Montana Association of Counties, along with other parties,
filed a lawsuit alleging that the ballot question Montana citizens
had voted on violated two election procedures codified in the Montana constitution.91 Specifically, the petitioners alleged violations
of the single-subject requirement92 and the separate-vote
requirement.93
The court quickly disposed of the single-subject challenge.94 It
reviewed the constitutional provisions language and held that the
express wording clearly indicated that the single-subject requirement was meant only to apply to bills the state legislature passed.95
Because Marsy’s Law was placed on the ballot through the citizen
initiative process, it was never technically a “bill” and, as a result,
was not subjected to this requirement.96
The ballot initiative did not fare as well against the separatevote requirement. The Supreme Court of Montana had previously
determined that a single amendment could potentially violate the
88. Mont. Ass’n of Ctys. (“MACo”) v. State, 404 P.3d 733 (Mont. 2017) (holding that the proposed constitutional amendment violated the state’s separate-vote
requirement). Id.
89. MONT. CONST. art. III, § 4; Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”) 404 P.3d
733, 735.
90. Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”) 404 P.3d 733, 735–36; see also Holly
K. Michels, Voter-approved Marsy’s Law Declared Void by Montana Supreme
Court, INDEPENDENT RECORD (Nov. 1, 2017), https://bit.ly/2pYcQGe [https://
perma.cc/3JUL-WNXC].
91. Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”), 404 P.3d at 736.
92. Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”) 404 P.3d 733, 736–37; see also MONT.
CONST. art. V, § 11(3).
93. Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”), 404 P.3d at 736–37; see also MONT.
CONST. art. XIV, § 11.
94. Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”), 404 P.3d at 740.
95. Id. at 740.
96. Id. at 740–41.
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separate-vote requirement if it had the effect of amending more
than one section of the state constitution.97 In MACo, the court
upheld that principle and ruled that the Marsy’s Law ballot initiative violated the separate-vote requirement by attempting to amend
numerous constitutional provisions through a singular vote.98 The
court nullified the vote and rendered the Marsy’s Law initiative
defeated.99
It is worth noting that getting a potential law placed on the
election ballot via citizen initiative is a difficult and often time-consuming process.100 In states like Pennsylvania, the legislature must
pass a constitutional amendment in two separate, consecutive sessions before it can submit the amendment to the public for a
vote.101 Further, the Montana Marsy’s Law initiative received approval by a wide margin of votes.102 Despite these efforts, a court
nullified the initiative in its entirety due to one procedural election
law.103 This is an outcome that could be avoided simply by dividing
the initiative into separate questions or by having the initiative vetted for potential violations prior to being placed on the ballot.104
c. Westerfield v. Ward
In early 2018, the Kentucky legislature passed its version of the
Marsy’s Law amendment.105 The amendment was scheduled to appear on the November 6, 2018 Kentucky ballot, and the question
that the voters would be presented with was published on July 22,
2018.106 The question read as follows: “Are you in favor of providing constitutional rights to victims of crime, including the right to be
97. Marshall v. State by & Through Cooney, 975 P.2d 325, 331–32 (Mont.
1999) (holding that ballot initiative CI-75 violated Montana’s separate-vote requirement because it sought to amend Article VIII, II, and VI of the constitution
through one all-encompassing vote).
98. Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”), 404 P.3d at 746–47 (overturning the
Marsy’s Law ballot initiative because it would have created a new section to Article II of Montana’s constitution, as well as amended Article VII § 2(3) and Article
II § 9, 10, 20, 21, and 24).
99. Id. at 734–35.
100. Initiative Process 101, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://
bit.ly/34Vcqiv [https://perma.cc/4PUA-X5N3] (last visited on Dec. 2, 2020).
101. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
102. Montana Marsy’s Law Crime Victims Rights Initiative, CI-116 (2016),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2Sgc4Qw [https://perma.cc/WRT8-C6VE] (last visited
Dec. 2, 2020) (showing that 66% of votes were in favor of the initiative).
103. Mont. Ass’n of Counties (“MACo”), 404 P.3d at 746–47.
104. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy
and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 723 (2010).
105. S.B. 3, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018).
106. Westerfield, 599 S.W.3d at 743–44.
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treated fairly, with dignity and respect, and the right to be informed
and to have a voice in the judicial process?”107 In response to the
question, the Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
Inc. filed a declaratory judgement action seeking a declaration that
the ballot question pertaining to SB 3 failed to adequately inform
the voters of the substance of the amendment in violation of Kentucky’s statutory and constitutional requirements.108 In other
words, the Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
challenged the ballot question for being unconstitutionally vague.
The state circuit court that first adjudicated the dispute allowed
the question to appear on the November ballot but enjoined the
Kentucky Secretary of State from certifying the ballots cast for or
against the proposed amendment until the Kentucky Supreme
Court could hear and decide the case.109 Marsy’s Law ultimately
received about 63 percent approval from Kentucky voters on election day.110 Considering the positive wording of the question, this
was not surprising to many people.111 In fact, while the Kentucky
Supreme Court was reviewing the case, Justice Michelle Keller
commented to a reporter, “[W]ho other than a sociopath is going to
answer any way but yes to that question?”112
On June 13, 2019, the Kentucky Supreme Court handed down
its ruling on the legitimacy of the Marsy’s Law question, nearly a
year after the ballot question was first introduced.113 The Court
held that the proposed amendment, as submitted to the voters
through the aforementioned question, was invalid under the Kentucky Constitution.114
The Kentucky Supreme Court took an interesting approach to
resolving this issue. It primarily looked to two sections of the Kentucky Constitution that pertained to the procedure and publication
of proposed amendments to the constitution.115 Section 256 of the
constitution provides that after a constitutional amendment has
passed each house of the General Assembly, “such proposed
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 744–45.
Kentucky Marsy’s Law Crime Victims Rights Amendment (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/3kOleOS [https://perma.cc/8K7A-BS5R] (last visited Dec.
21, 2019).
111. Ryland Barton, Ky. Supreme Court Hears Arguments Over Marsy’s Law
Ballot Language, 89.3 WFPL (Feb. 8, 2019), http://bit.ly/32mkLwH [https://
perma.cc/WF83-NXZK].
112. Id.
113. See generally Westerfield, 599 S.W.3d 738.
114. Id. at 740–41.
115. Id. at 2–5. See KY. CONST. § 256; KY. CONST. § 257.
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amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the voters of the
State for their ratification or rejection at the next general election
for members of the House of Representatives, the vote to be taken
thereon in such manner as the general assembly may provide
. . . .”116 The court stated that it had previously interpreted this as a
grant of exclusive authority to the General Assembly to determine
the process for submitting a proposed amendment to the electorate.117 In fact, granting the General Assembly control over
amendment procedures had been established precedent of the
Court for over 70 years,118 and the General Assembly relied on it to
enact election procedures.119
The other provision considered by the Court, Section 257,
provided:
Before an amendment shall be submitted to a vote, the Secretary
of State shall cause such proposed amendment, and the time that
the same is to be voted upon, to be published at least ninety days
before the vote is to be taken thereon in such manner as may be
prescribed by law.120

Put another way, the Secretary of State must publish the proposed
amendment to be voted on by the electorate 90 days before the
vote.121 This typically necessitates that the proposed amendment
be circulated in at least two statewide newspapers in the weeks
leading up to the vote.122
In considering these two sections, the Supreme Court of Kentucky determined that it could no longer justify its historic interpretation that these provisions granted the General Assembly
exclusive authority to determine election ballot-measure procedures.123 After dissecting the legislative intent and applying some
rules of statutory construction, the court concluded that the language “such proposed . . . amendments shall be submitted to the
voters” and “such proposed . . . amendments to be published” actually establish a constitutional requirement that the entirety of an
amendment must be published statewide prior to election day, and
the entirety of the amendment must appear on the ballot on elec116. KY. CONST. § 256.
117. Westerfield, 599 S.W.3d, at 747–48.
118. Hatcher v. Meredith, 173 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943).
119. Westerfield, 599 S.W.3d, at 747–48.
120. 120. KY. CONST. § 257.
121. Id. at 745.
122. Id. at 745–46; see, e.g., PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. The Pennsylvania Constitution requires the Secretary of the Commonwealth to publish the proposed
amendment in at least two newspapers in each county. Id.
123. Westerfield, 599 S.W.3d, at 747–48.
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tion day.124 By reevaluating the constitutional language and reversing decades of precedent, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
provided other states with one potential method for solving claims
that ballot questions are unconstitutionally vague.
d. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar
One of the more recent lawsuits filed against a Marsy’s Law
ballot initiative is League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar,125
which is currently proceeding through the Pennsylvania court system.126 The Pennsylvania electorate voted on the Marsy’s Law ballot question on November 5, 2019.127 One month prior, however,
the Pennsylvania League of Women Voters filed a lawsuit in opposition to the ballot question in Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth
Court, alleging that it violated the separate-vote requirement of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.128
On October 30, 2019, only six days prior to the vote, the Commonwealth Court issued an injunction on the ultimate result of the
vote.129 The injunction allowed voters to cast their ballots regarding Marsy’s Law; however, the votes will not be counted until after
the separate-vote question is resolved.130 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reaffirmed the injunction the day before election
day.131
124. Id. at 747–52.
125. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar, 2019 Pa. Commw. Unpub.
LEXIS 623 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2019).
126. Pennsylvania Marsy’s Law Crime Victims Rights Amendment (2019): Status of the Ballot Measure, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2pcx1zE [https://perma.cc/
DWP7-VH8X] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020). The Commonwealth Court is hearing
the case following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upholding the preliminary injunction issued by the Commonwealth Court “preventing Secretary of State
Boockvar from counting and certifying votes on the ballot measure, pending a final
ruling.” Id.
127. Erin McCarthy Holliday, Pennsylvania Voters Approve Marsy’s Law
Victims’ Rights Amendment with Constitutional Question Pending, JURIST (Nov. 6,
2019), https://bit.ly/2ENnT8E [https://perma.cc/2VJC-5KBM].
128. Id.
129. Ivey DeJesus, Marsy’s Law Question Will Appear on Ballot but Won’t be
Counted After Court Injunction; Advocates Slam Ruling, PENNLIVE (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://bit.ly/36W6fg9 [https://perma.cc/66BL-JQMA].
130. Id.
131. Paula Reed Ward, Pa. Supreme Court Backs Ruling to Not Count
Marsy’s Law Votes, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 4, 2019, 5:52 PM), https://
bit.ly/2Kh9IMu [https://perma.cc/WD2L-SW7M]; Matt Miller, ‘The Voices of the
People Should be Heard:’ Pa. Judges Hear Arguments on Marsy’s Law Victim
Rights Referendum, PENNLIVE (June 11, 2020), https://bit.ly/2Gga3jv [https://
perma.cc/SK2S-VHR4].
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As is demonstrated by MACo, Westerfield, and Boockvar,
there are some serious drawbacks to procedural election laws.
Some of these drawbacks will now be addressed further, followed
by a series of recommendations for how to counteract such
consequences.
III. ANALYSIS
As it currently stands, opponents of ballot questions have ample means to prevent or delay the adoption of any given bill.132 In
15 states, oppositional forces can rely on single-subject and separate-vote requirements as one method of nullifying ballot questions.133 In the 40 states that provide their citizens with some form
of referendum/ballot initiative process, adversaries may also allege
that the question that appears on the ballot is misleading or overbroad.134 Further, if opponents to a bill prevail on their challenges,
they may do more than just retroactively get the proposed amendment removed from the ballot.135 In states like Pennsylvania,
where the amendment process is difficult and takes a minimum of
two years to move the proposed legislation from the state legislature to the election ballot, successful opponents may effectively destroy any chance of the amendment being voted on again.136 And
all of this can be done through a procedural challenge—without
even considering the substance of the proposed amendment.
Part A of this section will examine the common procedural
election laws and challenges discussed in Part II of this Comment.
This includes the negative consequences of such laws and how opponents are subverting their intended purpose by using them to
block proposed amendments. Part B will then consider some of the
possible solutions to this problem and propose certain “best practices” for states to follow to abate these challenges.
A. Negative Impacts of Procedural Election Laws on Ballot
Questions/Initiatives
The use of procedural election laws to block ballot questions
leads to numerous ramifications. These range from the nullification
132. Supra Part II.C.
133. Single-subject Rule, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2NNObxb [https://
perma.cc/6R54-N9AH] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
134. Id.; see Westerfield, 599 S.W.3d 738.
135. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1; see also Legislatively Referred Constitutional
Amendment, Two-session Requirements, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2SiH6aA
[https://perma.cc/2SBZ-A4UR] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
136. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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of an entire bill because it was formatted incorrectly to stripping a
state electorate from making a meaningful choice without even
challenging the substance of the bill.137 This section will highlight
some of the major issues with current election laws.
1. Nullification Due to Bad Formatting
As previously mentioned, both single-subject and separatevote requirements allow opponents of a ballot question to prevent a
statewide vote simply because the bill encompasses more than one
area.138 The objective of such laws is to ensure that the public will
not have to vote on bills that may have hidden or unintended consequences not readily apparent to the average voter.139 While that is
a just rationale, it neglects to consider that some bills may be so
intertwined that separating them may be unfeasible. For instance,
imagine a citizen-initiated referendum focused on achieving
changes in labor conditions. Specifically, the referendum would increase the minimum wage and also provide sick-leave and maternity-leave. In a jurisdiction that strictly applies a separate-vote or
single-subject rule, voters may have to decide on each of these issues piecemeal or risk having the court reject their efforts.
That scenario highlights another major issue with procedural
election laws: the consequences of standard judicial remedies in
cases where a court finds a ballot question in violation of an election law are disproportionate to the relatively minor nature of the
offense—such as not parsing a bill into separate questions or not
being clear enough in the wording of the question.140 Assume that
a state legislature wanted to enact a constitutional amendment
prohibiting negative political advertising campaigns and also imposing a monetary penalty on any person/party who engaged in such
activity. If this change were to be presented to voters in a single
ballot question, it would risk violating the separate-vote requirement as it likely would change or create two constitutional provisions—one for the prohibition and one for the penalty. Even
though the bill is relatively clear, the public may never have a
chance to cast a vote on it should a court strike it down as violating
a separate-vote requirement. This would render useless all the time
activists and legislators took to get that amendment to the people,
which could be upwards of two years.141 It also has the potential to
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Supra Part II.C.
Supra Part II.B.
Supra note 43.
See, e.g., Mont. Ass’n of Ctys., 404 P.3d at 746–47.
See, e.g., PA. CONST. Art. XI, § 1.
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dissuade the legislature from attempting to pass the amendment
again. This outcome is unjust, especially considering the issue could
be alleviated by simply dividing the proposed amendment into two
distinct ballot questions.
2. Misleading Questions
As discussed earlier, drafting the wording of a ballot question
comes with inherent dangers.142 Such dangers include complicated
legalese that confuse the average voter and fail to describe the facets of a bill in great enough detail, as was the case with Amendment
8 in Florida regarding charter schools.143 In addition to these concerns, the drafters of the ballot language could write a misleading
question, regardless of whether a state imposes a word limit and/or
plain statement of fact.
One clear example of this comes from Pennsylvania and was
adjudicated in Sprague v. Cortes.144 The Republican-controlled legislature wanted to amend the state’s constitution to increase the
mandatory judicial retirement age from 70 to 75.145 This was
largely seen as a political move as the then-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania—a Republican affiliate—was 70 and
on the verge of mandatory retirement.146 The legislature passed the
amendment and submitted it to the public with a ballot question
that read, “Shall the Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to require that justices of the Supreme Court, judges, and magisterial
district judges be retired on the last day of the calendar year in
which they attain the age of 75?”147 Nowhere on the ballot did it
mention that there already was a mandatory retirement age in
place, and this would simply be raising the threshold. Consequently, it manipulated voters who were in favor of enacting a judicial retirement age by leading them to believe that this would be the
first time such a retirement age existed in Pennsylvania.148
The problematic nature of misleading questions is underscored
by the fact that, despite the plaintiffs in Sprague alleging that the
ballot question was unlawfully misleading/vague, the Supreme
142. Supra Part II.B.3.
143. Id.
144. Sprague v. Cortes, 150 A.3d 17 (Pa. 2016).
145. Id. at 17–18.
146. Harold Jackson, Inquirer Editorial: Misleading Ballot Question May
Raise Judge’s Retirement Age, PHILA. INQUIRER, https://bit.ly/2vqsj47 [https://
perma.cc/UKQ8-U2EK] (Sept. 2, 2016).
147. Sprague, 150 A.3d at 24 n.2.
148. Id. at 28 (Dougherty, J., dissenting).
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Court of Pennsylvania upheld the wording of the question.149 This
demonstrates that even where a ballot question is clearly misleading, the judicial standards are fluid enough that a deciding court
may still uphold the language. As noted earlier, the rate of a judge
upholding an initiative contested on single-subject grounds drops
from 83 percent when the judge favors the policy to 42 percent
when the judge disagrees with the policy.150 At the very least, this
demonstrates that voters cannot always trust state judges to make
unbiased rulings in situations where a policy question is involved.
Unfortunately, this is always the case for procedural election laws
where the decision to nullify a question de facto eliminates the proposed law, at least for a period of time.151
3. Invalidating the Voice of the People
In many instances, a procedural election law that successfully
blocks a proposed amendment nullifies the vote that the state electorate casts.152 This can occur either when a plaintiff files a challenge after the electorate has already voted on the proposal or
when one files a challenge prior to the election, and the deciding
court allows the question to be on the ballot but issues an injunction
preventing the votes from being counted until after it has made its
final decision.153 While this may not always be a negative outcome—for example, in instances where the ballot question actually
is misleading154—there is still the potential for unjust consequences.
One of the driving factors behind the push for direct democracy by the Progressives in the late 19th Century was the undue
control of state legislatures by special interest groups.155 That is
still a legitimate fear as procedural election laws provide special interest groups an opportunity to block certain proposals that they
may not favor on a basis as simple as the wording of the ballot
question being too vague. This is already an issue, as demonstrated
by the constant battle between Marsy’s Law and opposition groups
like the ACLU in most states where the initiative has been, or will
be, placed on the ballot.156 These groups are steadfast in their op149. Id. at 17–18.
150. Supra note 53.
151. See supra Part II.C.1.c.
152. See generally Westerfield, 599 S.W.3d 738; see also League of Women Voters, 219 A.3d 594.
153. See League of Women Voters, 219 A.3d 594.
154. Supra Part III.A.2.
155. Supra note 33.
156. Supra Part II.C.
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position to Marsy’s Law,157 so all they must do is wait for a state to
begin implementing the policy and then file a lawsuit against it alleging a violation of any of the procedural election laws mentioned
previously in this Comment. If any of their challenges to the ballot
measure are successful, then the measure is defeated without any
consideration for the actual substance of the proposed law and
without any input from the state electorate. Progressives likely did
not anticipate these challenges when they began advocating for direct democracy.
B. Methods for Resolving the Abuse of Procedural Election
Laws
While there may not be a single solution to the negative consequences of procedural election laws, there are certainly steps that
states could take to alleviate some of the harm. The following section will recommend some potential solutions states can implement
to prevent these negative consequences moving forward.
1. Publishing the Entirety of the Proposed Amendment
The first recommendation for combating the negative consequences of procedural election laws is to take the approach outlined
by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Westerfield v. Ward.158
There, the court decided that the statutory language of the state
constitution required that the proposed amendment be published in
its entirety on the ballot that the public would be voting on, as well
as in newspapers, during the months leading up to the vote.159
This approach would eradicate any challenges of the amendment being unconstitutionally vague or misleading. If the language
of the amendment is published in its entirety, then an opponent
could not possibly allege that the ballot was vague. There is an argument to be made that the legalese involved in a bill may still be
too confusing for the average person to understand. A state could
avoid this concern by requiring the Secretary of State to publish a
short and plain statement of the bill and its consequences to the
public in the months leading up to the vote—something that is already required in many states.160 By requiring the entirety of the
bill to be published and supplementing that with a plain statement
by the Secretary of State, there will be virtually no grounds to argue
157.
158.
159.
160.
(2004).

See Hruska, supra note 87.
Westerfield v. Ward, 599 S.W.3d 738, 751–52 (Ky. 2019).
Id. at 741–43.
See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1; see also 25 PA. ELECTION CODE § 201.1
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that a bill is unconstitutionally vague or misleading. Members of
the public will have an opportunity to educate themselves on the
substance and nature of the proposed amendment, and if there is
still confusion, they will have ample time to seek clarification. Further, and as will be discussed in the following section, a state legislature may grant its judiciary the authority to redraft plain statements
of fact should it determine that the language was misleading. So
long as the court’s revision falls within the specified timeline for
publishing plain statements, the bill would have to prevail and be
successfully submitted to the ballot.
A state judiciary could also adopt the principle from criminal
law of ignorantia juris non excusat, which dictates that somebody
who violates a law he or she is unaware of is not excused from criminal prosecution given that he or she had the resources to inform
him or herself that such a law existed.161 Used in the context of
ballot questions, the judiciary could say that given the publication
of the amendment, the plain statement by the secretary, and the
opportunity to clarify any uncertainties in the law, there are no
grounds to assert that a ballot question is misleading or vague.
2. Lenient Judicial Remedies
Next, state judicial systems should begin issuing remedies that
are more appropriate, given the relatively minor offense of not
complying with a procedural requirement. The process of getting a
bill from the legislature to the ballot is time consuming, and having
to repeat the effort just to have it overturned on a procedural technicality may frustrate the legislature into giving up on an otherwise
good law.162 State judiciaries should move away from the outright
nullification of a proposed amendment in favor of granting the state
legislature a reasonable amount of time to correct the error and
resubmit the amendment. Following the correction, the state could
either hold a special election with the sole purpose of voting on the
ballot question or simply wait until the next primary or general
election.
Doing either of these would result in a number of positive outcomes. The most obvious is still allowing the public to vote on a
policy, even if the vote is a little delayed. One of the biggest issues
with procedural election laws is that special interest groups utilize
them to prevent the public from ever making a decision on the pol161. Ignorantia juris non excusat, THE LAW DICTIONARY (2002).
162. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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icy.163 This recommendation would ensure that the ultimate arbiters of good and bad amendments are the people, as the
Progressives intended.
Another positive outcome would be remedies that are more
proportional to the relatively benign nature of the offense. In a
case where a ballot question violates a separate-vote or single-subject requirement, the courts could split the question into multiple
questions on their own accord rather than throw away the entire
bill. Alternatively, if a state court determines that splitting a ballot
question is a non-justiciable political question, it could call upon the
legislature to split the question itself.
In Pennsylvania, at least, there is already some precedent for
the courts giving the political branches a second chance to conform
otherwise unconstitutional legislation. In League of Women Voters
of Pa. v. Commonwealth, the plaintiffs alleged that the Pennsylvania Congressional Redistricting Map of 2011 violated redistricting requirements codified in the state constitution.164 Upon
finding a violation, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania provided
the legislative and executive branches a timetable by which they
could submit a new map, which would then be subjected to judicial
scrutiny.165 If the branches did not submit a new map within that
timetable, the court asserted that it would draft a new, acceptable
map itself.166 This approach mitigates the negative consequences of
procedural ballot challenges, and the court should implement it to
correct deficiencies in ballot questions.
3. Bipartisan Legislative Committees
A third recommendation is to create bipartisan committees
within the state legislature whose entire function is to draft permissible ballot questions. This recommendation may be the most challenging to implement as it would require the mutual cooperation of
the major parties in each state. Nonetheless, some of the negative
consequences of procedural election laws could be fixed were the
legislature of a state to establish a bipartisan committee dedicated
to drafting and publishing ballot questions.
When a proposed amendment is ready to be submitted to the
public, it would first have to go through the bipartisan committee in
which the members would work out the language of the prepared
163. Meyer, supra note 87.
164. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282, 289–90
(Pa. 2018).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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question. The hope is that, through consensus, any potential partisan manipulation of the question would be rendered impossible
through the cooperation of both parties.
There are some potential drawbacks to this idea. Namely, the
parties may be so gridlocked that the proposed amendment may die
in committee. Also, the minority party may use the committee as
solely a means to block amendments that it does not support, which
is already the primary issue surrounding special interest groups and
procedural election laws. However, a judicial safety net could
guard against both of these issues in a similar fashion as lenient
judicial remedies.167 If the legislature cannot agree on the wording
of a ballot question, or if one party is obstructing the process, the
legislature could call upon the courts to resolve the issue and draft
its own ballot question based on the substance of the law. Because
judges in many states still may have party affiliation, even this could
be mired in undue partisan influence, but it is nevertheless a step in
the right direction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Interest groups are subverting the purpose of procedural election laws. Rather than protecting voters from misleading ballots
and partisan influence, interest groups use said laws strategically to
prevent otherwise valid legislation from being submitted to a state’s
electorate for a public vote. Organizations that vehemently oppose
an initiative can have boilerplate complaints ready to be submitted
to a court the moment a ballot question is scheduled to appear in a
state election.
Publication of the entirety of a bill’s language and the allowance of more lenient judicial remedies will help alleviate these issues. If policies are put in place to prevent a bill from being
overturned in its entirety based on a successful challenge, oppositional groups will no longer depend on procedural election laws and
will instead have to focus on attacking the substantive aspects of the
legislation. Until then, these groups will continue to stifle or discount citizens’ voices and good laws before they have a chance to
receive a vote.

167. Supra Part III.B.2.

